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A DIFFERENT CASE FOR RESTRAINT
Michael W. Lewis*
Mark Osiel, The End ofReciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War (Cambridge
U. Press 2009). Pp. 676. $45.99.
INTRODUCTION
The United States' response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 has included
the use of coercive interrogations, indefinite detention, and the targeted killing of Al
Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. These responses have been
roundly criticized on legal, moral, and policy-making grounds by a wide range of
scholars, politicians, and activists. Vast numbers of books, articles, and editorials have
concluded that the Bush administration's legal, moral, and policy arguments were
incorrect, internally inconsistent, and unsustainable. But few have taken the next step to
consider the broader implications that this rejection of the Bush administration's policies
has for how law, morality, and politics are shaped by terrorism. What coherence does
law have if it countenances a series of heinous breaches (terrorism), but upholds its own
prohibitions against any practical response (increased intelligence collection through
coercion and increased incapacitation through detention and targeted killings)?1 What
fundamental moral principle(s) does international humanitarian law ("IHL")2 rest upon if
it creates a system that, from a consequentialist perspective, can be used to privilege its
most egregious violators? If law and morality fail to require a specific course of action,
what policy choices should a purely self-interested United States' government make
about detainee treatment and targeted killings in the face of Al Qaeda's continuing threat
to its civilians?
* Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law. I would like to thank
Sanford Levinson for inviting me to do this review.
** This is the price and pagination for the paperback edition.
1. For those that take issue with this formulation, replace the word "terrorism" with the word "torture" in
the first parenthetical and change the second parenthetical to "denying its victims civil or criminal remedies on
national security grounds" and the question about coherence may seem more appropriate. In both cases,
however, the law is allowing fundamental wrongs to continue by prohibiting responses to these wrongs on
rights-based (either individual or collective) grounds.
2. The laws of war are generally referred to as international humanitarian law ("IHL") and only apply
during armed conflicts. IHL contrasts with international human rights law which is the exclusive source of
international law in peacetime. The interplay between IHL and human rights law during armed conflicts will
receive considerable attention later in the review. Intl. Comm. of the Red Cross, What is the Difference between
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law?, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/5KZMUY
(posted Jan. 1, 2004).
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In his book The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War, Mark
Osiel 3 examines the challenges that terrorism poses to IHL and to the American policy
makers that must continue, modify, or reverse the policy responses to terrorism adopted
by the Bush administration. Wary of the ease with which writing on such topics can
become polemical, he sets out to dispassionately4 evaluate the implications of rejecting
the Bush era responses using the tools of law, philosophy, and sociology. His analysis, as
the title implies, focuses on the role that reciprocity plays in law, morality, and
international relations.
While the Bush administration did not explicitly justify its use of coercion,
detention, and targeted killings on reciprocal grounds, Osiel finds that legal and moral
arguments based upon the availability of reciprocity to restore the symmetry of risk
between the U.S. and Al Qaeda more compelling than those actually offered by
defenders of these policies. As a result, he frames the rejection of coercion, detention,
and targeted killings as a rejection of reciprocity and then considers whether this
diminution or elimination of reciprocity can be squared with existing understandings of
law and morality. In both cases he concludes, rather controversially many will say, that
neither law5 nor morality 6 clearly prohibit the resort to coercion, indefinite detention,
and targeted killings in response to Al Qaeda. But these conclusions should not be seen
as Osiel's endorsement of such policies. Osiel writes, "[t]hat law and morality permit
response in kind is not to say that they require it."7
Although law and morality may support (or at least fail to definitively condemn)
resort to reciprocity in response to terrorism, they do not exist in a vacuum. Osiel's
examination of the social science of war demonstrates the dangers inherent in resorting
to reciprocity and the limitations of (predominantly) bilateral game theory to truly
account for the costs and benefits of a multilateral world. If American self-interest lies in
retaining its place in the world, 8 Osiel concludes that it must acknowledge the
importance of soft power and seek to enhance that power whenever the concrete costs
are not intolerably high. This can be done by adopting a different conception of
reciprocity, a more diffuse, systemic, and multilateral reciprocity that is more
commensurate with American self-identity and global leadership. "The logic of law and
morality permits the United States to play by the same rules as its adversary. But the
logic of interest and identity requires it to play by different and more demanding ones." 9
CONCEPTIONS OF RECIPROCITY
Osiel describes several different conceptions of reciprocity. The first and most
3. Aliber Family Chair in Law, University of Iowa College of Law and Director of International Criminal
and Humanitarian Law of the T.M.C. Asser Institute, University of Amsterdam.
4. This book succeeds in coming across as one of the least agenda-driven works on the subject. Osiel is
equally critical of the legally contradictory, and at times incoherent, Bush era justifications for its responses to
terrorism and of the politicized, impractical, and at times intellectually sloppy work of its many critics.
5. Mark Osiel, Terror, Torture, and the Law of War 147-148 (Cambridge U. Press 2009).
6. Id at 218.
7. Id.
8. Osiel discusses that place in terms of the magnanimity of the hegemon. Id at 312-325.
9. Id at 396.
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frequently discussed is "tit-for-tat" reciprocity, also described as "retaliatory"
reciprocity. This version of reciprocity, having its roots in international relations
theory, finds a "duty to repay good deeds and at least a right to reciprocate bad ones," 1
It is potentially useful in ordering anarchic systems through the consistently
proportionate sanctioning of rules violations that leads to the possibility of cooperation.
If country A expels five of B's diplomats for alleged wrongdoings, then B will expel five
of A's.12 If B recognizes its wrongdoing, it might only expel four diplomats as a
conciliatory gesture, or it might expel six if it feels that A's actions were unjustified. 13
Additional steps may be taken if one side or the other continues to feel slighted, but if
consistently proportionate tit-for-tat exchanges continue, it should reestablish
equilibrium between A and B where there exists no outside force capable of doing so.14
The second meaning of reciprocity which might be described as "consensual"
reciprocity "involves rules applied equally to all parties in a conflict because these rules
reflect an acceptable balance of benefit and burden" that both sides find agreeable. 15 A
ready example of such reciprocity is the principle of equality among sovereign states.
This conception of reciprocity is linked to tit-for-tat because any acceptable balance
would have to allow parties to interact using tit-for-tat absent some other form of rule
enforcement.
It is the existence of just such an outside form of rule enforcement that defines the
third "social contract" meaning of reciprocity. Tit-for-tat is no longer necessary to
maintain equilibrium because the parties directly involved will look to the rule
enforcement mechanism to settle their disagreement and establish a new equilibrium for
them.16 Because no such effective enforcement mechanism exists at the international
level, particularly within the context of armed conflict, it is with tit-for-tat reciprocity
that Osiel is chiefly concerned.17
RECIPROCITY AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
Historically, humanitarian law embraced the role of reciprocity. Many early
treaties explicitly included provisions that allowed for the reciprocal treatment of the
enemy that was otherwise prohibited.18 The Lieber Code required that the enemy be
allowed quarter, but stated that enemy troops known to give no quarter should receive
none.19 Likewise, the 1907 Hague Convention stated that a violation of an armistice by
10. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 18-19.
11. Id. at 18.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 18.
15. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 19.
16. Id. at 21. Osiel also describes a fourth form, "deliberative reciprocity" that involves a reasoned
discussion between both parties that seeks to establish the rules to be equally applied to all parties, but indicates
that such a form of reciprocity is not possible between the United States and Al Qaeda. Id. at 240.
17. Id. at 21.
18. See e.g. Intl. Comm. of the Red Cross, Instructions for the Government ofArmies of the United States in
the Field (Lieber Code) (Apr. 24, 1863), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument.
19. Id. at art. 60, 62.
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one party would grant the opposing party the right to recommence hostilities.20 Even
when reciprocity was not explicitly provided for in the text of a treaty, states often
insisted upon their reciprocal rights. Forty parties to the 1925 Gas Protocol included
reservations allowing them to retaliate with poison gas against an enemy that used it
first. 21
The Gas Protocol reservations illustrate the practical application of tit-for-tat
during wartime. A state might retaliate in kind against the use of poison gas for the
purpose of restoring symmetry between the parties and attempting to encourage the rule
breaker to restore the equilibrium of non-use. After this reprisal, symmetrical gas warfare
may continue or the first user may cease using gas, thus restoring the symmetry of non-
use. This right of reprisal, which must be exercised proportionately to be lawful, also
appeals to a sense of fairness that should not allow the rule breaker to gain a military
advantage from violating a treaty. When the lack of any other effective enforcement
mechanism is considered, particularly any form of inter-conflict enforcement
mechanism, the practical importance of tit-for-tat reciprocity for IHL becomes clear. "If
humanitarian law is to reject reciprocity in key places, how may it do so without
discrediting only itself - that is, through its likely failure effectively to discipline actual
conduct between belligerents?" 22 It is on this issue of the right of reprisal that Osiel
focuses his attention. If the United States possesses a right of reprisal in its conflict with
Al Qaeda, then such a right might allow the use of coercion, indefinite detention, and
targeted killings even though each of those measures may be otherwise prohibited by
humanitarian law. 23
Osiel concedes that the role of reciprocity in humanitarian law has diminished
greatly in the past half century. He cites numerous anti-reciprocal provisions from the
1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I ("AP I").24 With respect to reprisals
specifically, the Geneva Conventions greatly restricted their application and AP I
forbade them almost entirely.25 But he points out that the United States has not ratified
20. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Annex to the Convention:
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land sec. 1, ch. 5, art. 40 (Oct. 18, 1907),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/hague04.asp#art40.
21. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 102.
22. Id. at 48.
23. An intuitively accessible justification for the right of reprisal can be found in the 2008 Colombian
rescue of hostages from the FARC. Colombian agents disguised themselves as members of an international
health NGO and infiltrated the FARC camp to locate the hostages. They then sent a Colombian military
helicopter painted with Venezuelan markings to pick up the hostages and a FARC leader. The FARC leader
was captured and the hostages were freed. Humanitarian law would consider this operation to be perfidious (a
state disguising its agents as members of an NGO) and therefore illegal if not for the right of reprisal that
allowed a proportionate response to the initial wrongdoing of hostage taking by the FARC. Id at 231 n. 78.
24. Id at 62-64.
25. See e.g. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 46 (Aug. 12, 1949), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflFULL/365?OpenDocument
(prohibiting reprisals against the sick and wounded); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 13 (Aug. 12, 1949), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULJ375?OpenDocument (prohibiting
reprisals against POW's); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 51-55 (June 8, 1977),
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument (prohibiting reprisals against civilians, civilian objects,
cultural objects, objects essential for the civilian population, and the natural environment).
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AP I, that it has persistently objected to any absolute prohibition of civilian reprisals, 26
and that it is not alone in its reservations about the prohibition of civilian reprisals. Both
the United Kingdom and France entered formal reservations against this prohibition
when they acceded to AP 1.27 Further, state practice has also continued to support the
existence of a right of reprisal. 28 This last point is particularly problematic for any claims
that a prohibition against civilian reprisals has become part of customary international
law, and most leading experts agree that reprisals are not absolutely prohibited, but rather
are "subject to stringent conditions."29
A challenge to the view that the United States could be legally correct in justifying
its use of coercion, indefinite detention, and targeted killings in response to the threat of
Al Qaeda comes from the human rights community.30 This challenge follows two
parallel lines of argument. The first argument is that humanitarian law and its right of
reprisal does not apply to the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda because
the conflict does not meet the threshold requirements of an "armed conflict." Because
humanitarian law only applies during armed conflicts, the absence of an armed conflict
means that human rights law is the only applicable source of law.31 The second
challenge concedes that an armed conflict exists, but insists that certain core human
rights provisions continue to apply during times of armed conflict, establishing a
different floor for conduct than that created by humanitarian law. 32
Osiel's response to these claims is sharp, incisive, and exceptionally important for
those that work in this field. He broadly decries the lack of practical seriousness
displayed by many of those involved in these debates. While satisfyingly clean
deontological lines are often drawn and defended by scholars, a refusal to consider the
actual consequences and the messy realities of the conflicts which these rules are being
asked to govern risks subjecting humanitarian law to ridicule by the practitioners (the
military) that must believe in humanitarian law if it is to act as any sort of practical
limitation on behavior. 33 Practitioners of humanitarian law have underscored the
importance that such credibility has for fostering compliance with the law's
restrictions, 34 but the academic community rarely appears interested in such
practicalities.
In response to the claim that the United States and Al Qaeda are not involved in an
26. This was in large part due to the Cold War logic of Mutually Assured Destruction. The United States
refused to recognize an absolute prohibition of the right of reprisal against a civilian population in response to
persistent, deliberate, and massive attacks directed against its own civilian population.
27. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 55.
28. Consistent state practice by itself does not prevent a prohibition from becoming a customary norm. The
mere fact that many states engage in torture does not undermine the customary prohibition against torture, in
part because torturing states do not claim to be legally justified in using torture. In contrast, states employing
reprisals often claim that such actions are legal adding the element of opinio juris to the practice. Id. at 55-57.
29. Customary International Humanitarian Law vol. L Rules 513 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., Cambridge U. Press 2005).
30. See Osiel, supra n. 5, at 98-101.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 109-110 n. 319.
34. See e.g. Geoffrey S. Corn et. al., The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military Perspective
(Oxford U. Press 2009).
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armed conflict, Osiel adds a concern about the politicization of scholarship to his broader
critique of scholarly disengagement. He describes the efforts of Mary Ellen O'Connell to
greatly narrow the definition of armed conflict and the application of humanitarian law.
O'Connell begins from the premise that legally "'armed conflict should be treated as a
declining category of human conduct' despite the existence of numerous significant
military confrontations. 35 She cites the intensity requirement used by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") in certain cases and describes a
"zone of combat" in which such an intensity requirement is met, as representing the
temporal and physical boundaries of humanitarian law's application. 36 However, in
establishing the criteria for determining the threshold of armed conflict, O'Connell
ignores other decisions that would lower such a threshold and she creates a territorial
control requirement that is not found in either the Geneva Conventions or Additional
Protocol II, instead relying on statements of "[1]earned European commentators." 37 To
Osiel this appears less like a scholarly attempt to describe the current state of the law and
more like a piece of litigation advocacy.38 Moreover, adopting such vague temporal and
physical boundaries, which are much more difficult to discern in the moment than they
are with the benefit of hindsight, are practically unworkable.
No serious scholar or practitioner of military affairs would define war so narrowly as to be
abruptly discontinuous in the way O'Connell suggests - to begin, end, and start up again
every time a soldier picks up or puts down a rifle on a given street corner. One is almost
embarrassed to have to mention such considerations since they may appear self-evident.
Yet prominent legal critics of the Bush administration like O'Connell make no effort to
anticipate and refute them.39
In responding to the claim that human rights law should apply co-extensively with
humanitarian law, Osiel returns to the important role that international relations theorists
believe reciprocity can play in ordering anarchic systems.40 Because human rights law
generally focuses on the universal application of fundamental norms, it leaves very little
room for reciprocity.4 1 The importation or overlay of human rights law into
humanitarian law threatens to remove or greatly diminish the effectiveness of the only
existing inter-conflict ordering mechanism, the use of tit-for-tat reciprocity. But even if
this undesirable result were not the case, Osiel points out that human rights law suffers
from internal conflicts of its own that will limit the clarity that many advocates see as its
contribution to humanizing armed conflict. While the United States' response to
terrorism clearly abridges the guarantees that human rights law grants to all people
(including terrorists), there is a question about how broadly such individual guarantees
can be read before they begin to interfere with the human right to personal security that
35. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 114.
36. Id. at 116-118.
37. Id. at 116.
38. Id. at 16 n. 28.
39. Id at ll4-115.
40. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 111, 120-121,
41. Id at 111.
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is supposed to be enjoyed by the terrorists' targets.42
Recasting the discussion about the amount of legal restraint humanitarian law
imposes on the principles of proportionality and military necessity into an argument
about the "boundaries" between competing "fundamental" human rights of freedom and
personal security is not likely to yield clearer or "better" answers. Rather, Osiel urges
human rights advocates to pay more attention to existing humanitarian law doctrines
(such as proportionality) that are as amenable to "objective" expert analysis as any
rights-based claim. Although he recognizes that such engagement from the human rights
community is unlikely, because in order to effectively engage in an internal critique of
humanitarian law, one must first acquire a sufficient knowledge of the subject, a
knowledge that most human rights advocates disdain. 43
Osiel concludes part one by reaffirming his view that humanitarian law should
remain the predominant body of law governing war, and that the principle of reciprocity
retains a central place within humanitarian law. As a result, he believes that the United
States' use of coercion, indefinite detentions, and targeted killings was not contrary to
international law as such law was understood and adopted by the United States.44
RECIPROCITY AND MORALITY
In assessing the morality of the Bush administration's responses to Al Qaeda, Osiel
examines the jurisprudential argument advanced by Jeremy Waldron, Rawlsian, and
Kantian conceptions of fairness and the role of humanitarian law as a vehicle for
corrective justice. He ultimately concludes that morality does not preclude the responses
to terrorism taken by the United States.
Waldron's jurisprudential claim is that a prohibition of brutality transcends
ordinary legal rules and positive law that are subject to revision in changing
circumstances. He describes the ban on torture as "archetypal" for liberal societies, and,
therefore, a ban that cannot be relaxed without dire consequences for the very legal
framework upon which liberal society stands. 45 Retaining his eye for the practical,
before engaging Waldron's main argument Osiel first mentions that the article which
was ostensibly directed towards the White House and national security policy makers
was made without apparently consulting any specialists in national security law or
intelligence gathering, another reminder of the apparent academic disinterest in actual
consequences. 46
Osiel takes issue with Waldron's conception that law is rooted in the principle of
non-brutality. If that is so, he asks, then how can law permit war, which is the epitome of
brutality even when all the "unnecessary" suffering has been eliminated?47 He goes on
to discuss the far more subtle "brutality" (mental as well as physical) that incarceration
inflicts upon its sufferers and points to cognitive psychology research that explains why
42. Id. at 134-136.
43. Id. at 146.
44. Id. at 147-148.
45. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 152-154.
46. Id. at 153 n. 12.
47. Id. at 154.
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torture will always be perceived as much more brutal than other sanctions which may
cause more damage.48 Finally, he addresses Waldron's argument for desirable ambiguity
in the law. Waldron believes that we should not attempt to define torture clearly, because
drawing a line invites conduct to approach that line. If our morality demands an absolute
prohibition on brutality, then inviting near-brutality is indefensible. 49 Osiel responds by
pointing out that the other side of ambiguity is the loss of accountability. If torture is
vaguely defined it will immunize public officials committing torture from civil suits and
may even do so for criminal actions.50 As a result, Osiel finds Waldron's concept that
morality demands an absolute prohibition on brutality unconvincing.
To the extent that "fairness" underlies the morality or justice of humanitarian law,
Osiel next examines Rawlsian and Kantian views of fairness and reciprocity. Osiel
describes 51 Rawlsian reciprocity as the pre-conflict agreement between parties about the
rules that will govern their interactions. This agreement takes place behind a "veil of
ignorance" which prevents either party from knowing which position it will occupy once
the rules are established. 52 In this way, each party decides what minimal protections it
finds acceptable should it find itself in a disadvantaged position. Rawls, however,
requires that both parties behind the veil of ignorance are interested in existing within the
same society.53 Where that shared interest does not exist, as Osiel believes it does not
exist between the United States and Al Qaeda based upon Al Qaeda's insistence that the
West be destroyed and upon American unwillingness to accept civilian targeting,
Rawlsian reciprocity cannot apply. For Rawls, "[t]hose who will not sign this social
contract remain in the state of nature, where nothing done to or by them can hence be
considered unjust." 54 Osiel stresses, however, that although the two sides do not
currently share a compatible vision of society, thus permitting the moral choice of
adopting harsh measures against one another, this does not relieve the United States from
the responsibility of trying to seek some future mode of coexistence.55 Osiel describes a
Kantian view of fairness as one that allows each participant in a social interaction to
impose risks upon others only so long as the other may impose the same risks on him or
her.56 Unlike Rawls, Kant does not require the participants to share a vision for society,
but instead only requires that "a given maxim of conduct can, in principle, be extended to
all concerned, governing them equally." 57 The only qualification is that such a
48. Id at 157-159. He discusses the "mental 'heuristics"' which make the mental conception of graphic
punishment far more available and mentally "comprehensible" to outside observers than the more subtly
damaging effects of less graphic sanctions. There is an argument to be made that corporal punishment is more
ethically defensible than incarceration in some circumstances, a claim that observers would find
psychologically hard to comprehend. Id. at 158.
49. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 164-165; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White
House, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681, 1695-1717 (2005).
50. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 165.
51. My own limited knowledge of Rawls and Kant does not allow me to fairly critique Osiel's
characterization of their works and those of their many interpreters. Therefore, this portion of the review will
be limited to describing Osiel's characterization of their works and the conclusions he draws from them.
52. Id. at 168-177.
53. Id. at 173.
54. Id. at 176.
55. Id. at 176-177.
56. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 180.
57. Id. at 181.
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generalized maxim of conduct must be sustainable. 58
Terrorism is "unfair" because of the choice to which it puts its victims. Osiel
illustrates this choice by recalling a statement attributed to Golda Meir in her
conversation with an Egyptian interlocutor: "We can perhaps someday forgive you for
killing our children, but we cannot forgive you for making us kill your children." 59 By
making its targets choose between protecting their own innocents and waging war upon
other innocents, terrorism strikes at the heart of western liberal identity, thus disrupting
the symmetry of risk between the parties. Were the West to restore symmetry by joining
with Al Qaeda and applying this maxim of conduct equally, it would be unsustainable,
for a truly reciprocal response to the 9/11 attacks that took into account both the
symbolic value of the targets and the magnitude of the civilian harm would involve
capturing a Saudi Arabian airliner and flying it into Mecca during the Hajj. 60 Because
such a response is unthinkable, then to some extent we have already reached the end of
reciprocity.
But if the task of legal justice is to restore the symmetry of risk by imposing
offsetting risks upon rule violators and tit-for-tat reciprocity presently offers the only
means for imposing offsetting risks, then might other less horrific and more sustainable
responses be justified?61 This leads to a central question that Osiel says has never even
been posed in the public debate over torture: "Are torture, sustained detention, and
targeted killing ever a commensurate response to terror? Do they contribute to restoring
the symmetry of risk that humanitarian law seeks to maintain?" 62 Although he does not
purport to directly answer this question, Osiel does remind the reader that humanitarian
law understands fairness as a matter of process, not of result. Jus in bello rules apply to
aggressor and victim alike and are not subject to modification for the purposes of
63facilitating the just result that aggression should fail. This can cut both ways in
answering the question posed. On the one hand, because humanitarian law is not
designed to yield a specific outcome to a conflict (e.g. that terrorists should lose), then it
will not grant those opposing terror any special exemptions from its restrictions. On the
other hand, terrorists clearly violate humanitarian law and if it can be shown that the use
of proportionate reprisals (coercion, etc.) serves to restore the symmetry of risk thereby
improving the overall process between the parties, then it could be argued that such
reprisals are justified.
Osiel concludes his discussion of morality by saying that, like law, morality
operating exclusively on its own, does not prohibit coercion, indefinite detention, and
targeted killings of Al Qaeda leadership. But he also reiterates that just because morality,
like law, allows something does not mean that it recommends it.
58. Id. at 182. It is this sustainability requirement that made the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction
immoral. Even though the maxim of conduct (mutual annihilation) was extended to both parties, its
implementation was not sustainable and therefore immoral from a Kantian perspective.
59. Id. at 179-180.
60. Id. at 208.
61. Osiel,supran.5,at 181.
62. Id. at 211.
63. Id. at 212.
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RECIPROCITY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF WAR
If law and morality accept the use of tit-for-tat reciprocity as an ordering
mechanism during armed conflict, the question still remains whether it is a mechanism
that the United States should resort to in responding to Al Qaeda. Osiel's discussion of
cultural sociology in wartime calls into doubt the advisability of employing tit-for-tat
reciprocity because of its likely ineffectiveness in restoring symmetry and because of the
costs that it will impose upon the United States for resorting to reciprocal measures.
One fundamental risk associated with tit-for-tat reciprocity is the possibility of
escalation. To return to the Gas Protocol example used at the beginning of this review,
one scenario envisions the initial violator (A) reacting to retaliation in kind (by B) by
returning to the equilibrium of non-use. Another possible response from A would be to
increase the use of gas and spread it across other sectors of the battlefield. B might
respond in kind and A might react to that retaliation by attacking B's cities with gas. If
this sort of escalation is one foreseeable outcome of tit-for-tat reciprocity, it behooves us
to understand the likelihood of this undeniably negative outcome. The social science of
war tells us that escalation is not only a possible result of tit-for-tat reciprocity, but that it
is the likely result.64 Because the language of war inherently inflates the threat, portrays
opponents negatively, and because the fog of war is likely to prevent an accurate
understanding of an opponent's counter moves, tit-for-tat is more likely to lead to an
escalating spiral of violence rather than a restoration of pre-violation equilibrium. 65
This compelling narrative not only casts doubt on the wisdom of employing tit-for-
tat reciprocity in this case, it seems to potentially undercut Osiel's earlier conclusions
about reciprocity's place in humanitarian law. But a close inspection of his conclusion
after part one confirms that he is focused on whether the American belief that
humanitarian law includes the right of reprisal can be legally justified, not on making a
prescriptive recommendation that tit-for-tat reciprocity remain undisturbed by
humanitarian law. Still, the prescriptive tone that much of part one takes seems to be
placed in doubt by this sociological view of tit-for-tat reciprocity.
Osiel also challenges the wisdom of the American response to Al Qaeda on purely
self-interested grounds. America's place in the world matters. Its ambition to spread its
best ideals and institutions throughout the world are a source of tremendous "soft power"
that positively influences the actions of other nations toward the United States in both
subtle and profound ways. To the extent that a lack of American restraint in its response
to Al Qaeda damages that power, that lack of restraint should be reexamined. "In the
'war on terror,' it is the ambition for power - through power's own logic - that should
lead to American restraint, more than any norms of law or morality."66
Still another view that counsels American restraint builds on the importance of soft
power and America's place in the world. If the United States occupies the position of
hegemon, then it benefits greatly from stability in the world order. To preserve this
systemic stability, self-interested hegemons willingly incur short-term costs in order to
64. Id. at 244-248.
65. Id. at 246, 258-259, 273-274.
66. Osiel, supra n. 5, at 303.
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punish rule violators that challenge stability. Osiel indicates that the United States has
often behaved this way in trade disputes, accepting short-term costs for itself in order to
punish other rule violators and restore stability to a system from which the United States
derives a tremendous overall benefit.67 Similarly, American restraint in its response to Al
Qaeda would "punish" the rule violator in the long term by confirming its complete
isolation from the world community. The short-term costs of foregoing coercion and
limiting detention, and Osiel acknowledges that these may represent real short-term costs
in terms of lost intelligence and reduced incapacitation of our enemies, are outweighed
by the long-term benefit of isolating our enemies and reestablishing our international
standing. "America can better advance its claims to global stewardship by sponsoring
systemic reciprocity of this latter sort than by indulging more specific forms of
reciprocity, whether tit-for-tat or fighting fairly by morally abominable rules." 68
CONCLUSION
The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War makes a compelling
case for the voluntary exercise of American self-restraint in its continuing conflict with
Al Qaeda. Unlike so much of the scholarship that deals with the issues of torture and
terrorism in this context, Osiel retains a professional distance from the political
implications of his conclusions. He also manages to retain a pragmatic grounding
throughout his wide ranging review of the opinions offered on this subject by the
disciplines of legal and moral philosophy and sociology. By doing so, Osiel has put
together a book that needs to be read carefully by anyone that thinks seriously about the
issues of war and counterterrorism confronting the United States.
67. Id. at 309.
68. Id. at 387.
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